Steven Carter wrote:
Richard Casto wrote:
There is real evidence the containment has failed on one of the reactors.
Where is proof of this containment breech? I'm talking about the core, as in meltdown through the concrete containment vessel/apparatus. I have seen/read lots of info about cooling the spent fuel pools, the cooling system for the reactors, and the radiation from those aspects but nothing like a containment failure. The explosions have been related to steam/de-pressurization attempts and consequences thereof, with minimal amounts of iodide and cesium, but not a core breach/meltdown. Of course, there are multiple layers of containment (as noted in the diagrams on the link I posted) so one person's (say, anti-nuclear advocate) "failure" may not be the same as someone who is involved in the nuclear industry.
I take back my comment about the evidence regarding the failure of a containment vessel. I was going upon reports from three days ago after the explosion at reactor 2. If I remember correctly after the explosion some pressure readings showed a lower pressure in the containment vessel and that adding water didn't raise the pressure. The implication was that it had a leak and would not hold the higher pressures. Nobody knew for sure, but that was the initial analysis. I believe that since that initial report was written they say the damage appears to have been to the suppression pool at the bottom of the containment vessel and not the containment vessel itself. Frankly I am ecstatic I was wrong as I hope the vessels remain intact.
Steven Carter wrote:
The issue is not a structural problem with the plants. Yes, they are old, and yes, there are better designs. But the best I can gather indicates that it was built to withstand an 8.0 earthquake and a 6 meter tsunami--it got whacked by a 9.0 and a 7-10 meter tsunami. It was a highly improbable event, and apparently the engineers were OK with tolerating that "tail risk." I suppose now they need to plan for a 10.0 magnitude quake and resultant tsunami. Putting diesel generators higher up, having longer-duration battery back-up, having an ocean-water emergency cooling backup system--who knows? And when an 11.0 quake hits, what will the critics then say? (partly saying this in jest, but critics will always criticize no matter how well something is built/planned.)
You may not have been addressing me with the comment about the structural problem, but if you are, I never said there was. If I was to make any comment it would be that in my opinion it was not a stretch to envision a 9.0 quake in that area. Apparently these reactors were built to sustain the parameters of a 7.3 quake that happened in the US in 1952. I guess you have to pick some target and while a magnitude 7 is not a terrible target, I personally I think they set the bar on the low side given their location. And I don't think that is a hindsight comment. They started construction on that plant in 1967. In 1960 Chile had the largest earthquake then (or since) at 9.5. In 1964 Alaska experienced a 9.2 earthquake along with a tsunami that had a 100ft wave. With this type of recent history within the "Ring of Fire" I know someone put one and one together and knew it might happen at the location of this Japanese plant. And I am sure some estimates were put together to see what it would take to protect against a larger quake and a large tsunami and I am sure it was a cost issue. I am not saying you don't ignore cost, but if you build reactors on the edge of fault lines and directly on the coast, you are tempting fate. Don't set the bar so low. But we as a human race have to learn things the hard way. I guess it is how we are wired.
But you would ask the question "Well, what should we design for?" I would say at a minimum they should design for a 9.0 quake as that is the range of the largest known. Even then, most everyone feels it wasn't the quake that really created the problem, but the tsunami. If anything they should look harder at the effects of tsunamis and other disasters that can eat into the redundancy that they count upon. The use of "defense in depth" is a great strategy. But if a single (and not far fetched) event can cripple a critical portion of your redundancy then your plan has a big hole in it. I don't want to speculate as to how they had protected their backup diesel generators, but I would love to know what measures were taken. I hope they were not sitting between the main reactors and the beach!
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Richard Casto
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